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1Three Ebola survivors trained as facility-based 
ERVs – known as ‘caregivers’ – being briefed 
on infection and prevention (IPC) practices by 
doctors at the Maforki ETU in Port Loko city.
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This SSHAP Case Study explores the effective implementation of a community health 
worker (CHW) programme during the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) epidemic within 
a collapsed health system in Port Loko district, Sierra Leone. Fear, misinformation, 
and distrust meant that a comprehensive community-based response was needed 
to support effective disease screening and referral to Ebola treatment facilities. 
Partners in Health (PIH), a health-care non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
founded in the USA, delivered a CHW programme that provided 250,000 people 
affected by Ebola in Port Loko district with health system services and linkages 
required to combat Ebola.
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The challenge: lack of trust in 
and referrals to biomedical 
health care
In January 2015, the Ebola epidemic was at a 
peak in the Port Loko district of Sierra Leone. 
Fear, panic, and distrust in response partners had 
led to a complete collapse of the health system. 
In a desperate bid to curb the spread of the 
disease, the British military had established a 
District Command Centre (DCC) in the compound 
of local Ministry of Health offices in Port Loko 
city and was leading the coordination of all NGOs 
and the three Ebola Treatment Units (ETUs). 
A community-based needs assessment amongst 
Ebola-affected communities conducted by 
PIH showed that setting up ETUs alone was 
not enough. Additional support was needed 
to ensure that referrals were made, and that 
people had enough trust to turn up for 
appointments once referred. 
Key findings of an initial 
assessment of community needs
PIH staff undertook and an initial assessment of 
the Ebola response within affected communities 
using qualitative research methods, including 
interviews with stakeholders and assessment of 
existing response mechanisms and 
partners. This initial assessment was 
necessary in order to understand 
the operational context, and it helped 
to identify the following gaps in 
response mechanisms. 
Challenges with active case 
finding: The assessment showed 
that aid workers entered 
communities using a surge pattern, 
where 20-30 workers boarded a bus into the 
centre of a community, and once off the bus, 
they ‘surged’ through the community, providing 
education about the signs and symptoms of Ebola, 
and explaining how to call an ambulance. 
At the same time, NGO and government partners 
reported that no one was specifically looking for 
sick people or systematically surveying and 
checking communities and families for symptoms 
of Ebola.
Reported fear of treatment: Fear of the 
Ebola response – due to a combination of 
historical grievances, lack of information, and 
misinformation – caused affected people to flee 
instead of seeking treatment, thereby spreading 
the disease. The following reasons were presented 
by communities during the assessment: fear of 
what may happen at the ETUs; limited information 
on treatment pathways; and fear of army-enforced 
quarantines in which there was limited availability 
of food, water, and power. These all contributed to 
unnecessary suffering and anger over response 
measures, which were often not completely 
understood.
Mistrust of information about Ebola and its 
prevention: Misinformation was omnipresent 
and caused many to fear, and lose trust in, Ebola 
response mechanisms. A particularly prevalent 
belief was that Ebola was ‘invented by foreigners’ 
and that ‘you would catch it if you went to a hospital’. 
Another was that the NGOs who were fighting 
the disease were ‘actually spreading it’. Such 
misinformation caused people to fear health-care 
workers, and delayed notification of cases and 
access to essential care.
Stigma and lack of reintegration plan: When 
survivors or people who were tested for Ebola 
(regardless of whether the test was positive or 
negative) arrived back in their communities, they 
were often ostracised and faced discrimination. 
For example, those who survived the virus were 
blamed for those who had died, and they were often 
avoided out of fear of contamination.
 The CHWs 
were selected and 
monitored by their 
communities, and 
had to be literate 
and be regarded 
as ‘community 
leaders’. 
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 Programme design: cadres of 
CHWs to improve surveillance, 
care, and Psycho-Social Support
To fill the identified gaps, a programme in Port 
Loko district was created with a total of 
656 newly recruited CHWs and it ran between 
January and July 2015. It was rolled out in three 
of the chiefdoms (third-level units of administration 
in Sierra Leone) with the highest disease incidence: 
Port Loko, Kafu Bullum, and Maforki. The 
CHWs were selected and monitored by their 
communities, and had to be literate and be 
regarded as ‘community leaders’. PIH paid the 
CHWs a monthly stipend and all volunteers 
received a three-day training and additional 
specialised training depending on their roles, 
as detailed below. 
Emergency Response Volunteers (ERVs): 
519 ERVs were hired as ‘active case finders’ 
and delivered evidence-based 
health messages in their own 
communities. On a day-to-day 
basis, they went 
from door to door to find sick 
people in the community 
and provided supporting 
health messages to families. 
The ERVs spoke with 
approximately 17,000 people 
every week during the normal 
course of their work.
Facility-based ERVs (referred 
to as ‘caregivers’ inside the ETUs): 19 facility-based 
ERVs provided psychosocial support to patients 
inside the ETUs and acted as communication 
links to the village and families. Their role included 
fulfilling practical care, such as supplying patients 
with water when requested, and also offering 
mental support, like comforting chats or prayers. 
Psychosocial support ERVs: 118 Psycho-Social 
Support ERVs provided emotional and social 
support in their communities; specifically, organising 
the community to support quarantined families, 
helping Ebola survivors reintegrate, and keeping 
families updated on the health status of any member 
who was Ebola positive and in an ETU. 
Programme coordinators: Programme 
coordinators made weekly visitºs to the programme 
chiefdoms to meet with their CHWs in order to 
collect data, provide ongoing training, and solve 
programme- and epidemic-related issues as they 
arose in the communities. 
Data collectors: Four data collectors manually 
inputted data collected by the volunteers using 
a randomised controlled method. As data was 
collected from over 17,000 people each day, it was 
not possible to enter all of the data collected. To 
address this, a randomised program identified 
which pages would be entered into the database. 
Lessons learned
The CHW programme provided the following 
lessons learned: 
• Community support, including that of local 
leaders, is essential to ensure trust in the CHWs. 
This can be done by gaining approval from 
community and government leaders early in 
the process and allowing communities to select 
the CHWs.
• Continuous communication, with integrated 
feedback loops monitoring performance and 
improvement, created a flexible and dynamic 
programme that had the capacity to adapt 
quickly as the epidemic evolved. This was done by 
utilising a management structure that promoted 
the flow of information both up and down. There 
were weekly meetings with the CHW managers 
in the field, where issues with implementation 
 Continuous 
communication, with 
integrated feedback 
loops monitoring 
performance and 
improvement, created 
a flexible and dynamic 
programme that had 
the capacity to adapt 
quickly as the 
epidemic evolved. 
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were discussed and resolved, data were 
collected, and health messages for the 
following week were shared. Managers 
were then charged with delivering 
this information to their CHWs and the 
coordinators returned to headquarters 
with information that was used to inform 
programme decisions for the following 
week.
• Paying CHWs a fair stipend meant that they 
took their responsibilities very seriously 
and, at times, even filled other health 
system gaps caused by the epidemic. For 
example, a midwife who was part of the 
programme began visiting all the pregnant 
women in her catchment area in her own 
time, as there were no clinics providing 
prenatal care.
